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DEI and Disparate Impact

Andrew M. Grossman and Kristin A. Shapiro Feb 05, 2025

The Wall Street Journal first published this opinion piece.

On day two of his administration, President Trump ordered federal agencies to terminate “diversity, equity and inclusion” programs in the government and combat them in the private sector. The order follows through on his promise to forge a colorblind, merit-based society and to end the engineering of race and sex into every aspect of American life.

If Mr. Trump is serious about his goal, he also needs to repudiate disparate-impact theory, which prohibits facially neutral practices that have a disproportionate impact on a protected group. In practice, it often harms the people it’s supposed to protect. And it’s unconstitutional.

Disparate-impact theory was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971). Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination by employers. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission applied this prohibition to any policy that had a disparate impact on racial minorities—even absent intentional discrimination. The EEOC argued that the purpose of Title VII was to “accomplish economic results, not merely to influence motives or feelings.” The justices agreed and blocked Duke Power from requiring a passing score on a standardized test and a high-school diploma as conditions of employment, as these requirements disqualified black applicants at a higher rate than whites.

Griggs limited aptitude testing by employers, but not the need for aptitude. Many businesses found a proxy in college-degree requirements, which seemed legally safer given that colleges widely engaged in racial balancing. But applicants with ability but not credentials were blocked from positions.

Griggs was limited to employment law, but disparate-impact theory has since infected many levels of the federal government. It applies to federally funded programs under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, creditors under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, landlords under the Fair Housing Act, and broadband providers under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. It has been used to block criminal-background tests on rent applications, school-discipline policies and underwriting criteria for home insurance. Landlords successfully sued the city of St. Paul, Minn., for “aggressively” enforcing its housing code because it required landlords to respond to rodent infestations, broken smoke detectors and other hazards, which could increase rent and disproportionately affect black tenants.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that racial balancing is “patently unconstitutional,” as in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). Yet as the justices explained in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009), disparate-impact theory dictates that policies with an “undesirable racial effect” are invalid. If a race-neutral policy affects racial outcomes—or appears to do so—the burden falls on the employer to prove that the policy is essential, a daunting standard.

In practice this means that employers, landlords and other businesses must track and plan for racial outcomes to maintain racial balance. Before adopting policies such as drug tests, they must assess the racial impact and consider alternatives that might achieve a more desirable racial balance. Race must be constantly monitored to identify potential liabilities. As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in Ricci, disparate-impact theory places a “racial thumb on the scales” and requires employers to make decisions “because of” racial outcomes.

Mr. Trump accordingly should direct his administration to reverse all rules and cease enforcement based on disparate-impact theory, and he should support litigation challenging its constitutionality. Scalia warned in Ricci that one day the Supreme Court “will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?” Mr. Trump should bring forth that day of reckoning.

Mr. Grossman is a senior legal fellow at The Buckeye Institute. Ms. Shapiro is a senior fellow at the Independent Women’s Forum. Both practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. Appeared in the February 6, 2025, print edition as 'DEI and Disparate Impact'.